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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN JUVENILE COURTS
Chester James Antieaut
Under the prevailing judicial response today most of our traditional
constitutional rights, accorded even to hardened criminals, are denied
to children exposed to juvenile court proceedings. This should be a
matter of serious concern if only a hundred youths a year were involved.
The number of affected juveniles far surpasses popular impressions.
For instance, in 1959 in the 1,789 cities of over 2,500 population alone,
there were 519,685 children arrested.1 In the same year, according to
the best reports available, there were 483,000 juvenile delinquency cases
(exclusive of traffic offenses) handled by the juvenile courts of the
United States, and in that year an additional 290,000 traffic offenses
were charged against youths The time has come to seriously inquire
if there are persuasive reasons why these young persons are to be denied
constitutional rights.
First, let us consider what can happen to a minor when he or she is
apprehended by the police or juvenile authorities for alleged misbehavior.
The record indicates that the child may linger weeks and even months
in places of detention without even a hearing. To illustrate, a Washing-
ton, D. C., newspaper reported in 1951 that children were being detained
there without a hearing for 41, 50, 53, 92 and 107 days.3 Other reliable
sources attest that youngsters have been held for six months while
awaiting disposition of their cases.4 In many parts of the country the
child may be held in police lock-ups and county jails in association with
all sorts of adult criminals." Youngsters not at all delinquent when
picked up may well be deviants after such "care" by the state before it
t See contributors' section, masthead p. 458, for biographical data.
1 U.S. Dep't of justice, Crime in the United States 99 (1960).
2 U.S. Dep't of Health Education and Welfare, Juvenile Court Statistics, 1959, 1-2
(Children's Bureau Statistical Series #61, 1960).
3 Washington Post, June 7, 1961, p. 1, col. 2.
4 White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D. D.C. 1954) (six months); United States v.
Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (five to six weeks).
5 A hundred thousand children aged seven to seventeen are detained in county jails and
police lock-ups, according to Fine, 1,000,000 Delinquents 285 (1955).
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is ready to try them or return them to their homes and families. A
reader who might imagine that these are all youthful monsters who
might well be removed from free society should reflect upon the best
available figures that indicate that 43 per cent of all the children de-
tained overnight or longer are released without even being brought
before a juvenile court judge.6 A recognition of constitutional rights
seems imperative if children are being picked up with such enthusiasm
and kept for such periods without hearings.
Judicial refusal to acknowledge constitutional safeguards in juvenile
court proceedings is customarily defended on the theory that the pro-
ceedings are "non-criminal," or on the alternative ground that the com-
mitment or disposition meted out is not "punishment" but only "pro-
tection." Let us see if juvenile court proceedings can be truly labelled
"non-criminal." At a time when the Michigan legislature was piously
affirming that juvenile court proceedings "shall not be taken to be crimi-
nal proceedings in any sense" it was authorizing juvenile court judges
to impose fines upon the children! Happily it can be reported that
Michigan's Supreme Court ruled that such fines were clearly punish-
ments and that children subjected to such punitive sanctions were en-
titled to constitutional rights.7 In a number of states juvenile courts
can still fine minors' and it should be obvious to all that proceedings so
culminating are "criminal." Consider further the action of an Ohio
court that insisted juvenile court proceedings were "non-criminal" while
allowing a child to be sent to the state reformatory, an institution de-
scribed by the appellate court as "a prison for persons who are convicted
of felonies and committed thereto upon a sentence of the court follow-
ing such conviction," but withal, in the mind of this court, a good place
to reform juveniles.9- It is surely impossible to apply the "non-criminal"
label in all those states where children can be transferred to adult penal
institutions by executive action.' ° In these jurisdictions the "non-
criminality" of juvenile court proceedings is "more fiction than fact.""
Professor Tappan, a learned sociologist who has long given careful at-
tention to the problems of juvenile delinquency, has maintained "that
at the child's level the experience of a delinquency adjudication in the
6 Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 187 (1949).
7 Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908).
8 E.g., -Colorado Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-8-1(3) (1953) (up to fifty dollars if child is
over fourteen). Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 192 (1949).
9 Leonard v. Licker, 3 Ohio App. 377, 381, (1914). The decision is criticized by Flexner
& Oppenheimer, The Legal Aspects of the Juvenile Court 9 (United States Children's
Bureau Publication No. 99 1922).
10 Sheridan, "Double Jeopardy and Waiver in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings," 23
Fed. Prob., Dec. 1959, p. 43.
11 Rubin, Crime and Juvenile Delinquency 70 (1958).
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juvenile court, its treatment consequences, and its effect upon his reputa-
tion and his self-esteem are as severe-very often more so--as criminal
conviction is to an adult." He adds, "In spite of this, the insensitive
perceptions of an adult world, what appears to be a self-deception in-
duced by benign but misdirected motives, persists in viewing the court
handling of the child as an innocuous or even a generally constructive
experience." And he concludes that labelling juvenile court proceedings
as "non-criminal" is "a convenient but highly misleading sophistry.'
12
Of a statement in the California juvenile court law that adjudication
of minors to be wards of the court "shall not be deemed to be a con-
viction of crime," a California appellate court said "for all practical
purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and
doing violence to reason." 3 The New Jersey Juvenile Delinquency
Commission, referring to the juvenile court, has admitted that "In the
generally current impressions of the public at large and of the children
with whom it deals, it is a court of criminal law."' 4 Social workers who
are constantly before juvenile courts seemingly understand and admit
that "these special courts have operated under the name of juvenile
courts but have actually functioned more like criminal courts."' 5 Many
of the social stigmas attendant upon criminal conviction customarily at-
tach to children who have been adjudicated delinquent and sent away
to reformatories: difficulties in securing employment, economic advance-
ment, entrance to schools and colleges, and restricted professional op-
portunities." Indeed, even the law itself has recognized the "criminal"
consequences when it allows persons to be impeached as witnesses by
questioning about their difficulties with juvenile authorities" To the
extent that labels are important to the judiciary it seems clear, in summa-
tion, that proceedings resulting in the deprivation of one's liberty by the
state and his incarceration are assuredly "criminal."
How accurate and honest are the customary assertions of the judiciary
that children are not "punished" by the juvenile courts? Let the reader
himself characterize the action of a New Jersey juvenile court judge
who had three boys aged 12, 14 and 15 whipped with a police sergeant's
belt! 18 Much more realistic is the conclusion of a Texas court "that the
12 Tappan, "Unofficial Delinquency," 29 Neb. L. Rev. 547, 548 (1950).
13 In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952).
14 "Justice and the Child in New Jersey," 1939 Report of the New Jersey Juvenile De-
linquency Commission, 153.
15 Kvaraceus, The Community and the Delinquent 445 (1954). And see Ellrod & Mel-
aney, "Juvenile Justice: Treatment or Travesty?," 11 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 277, 279 (1950).
16 Sheridan, "Double Jeopardy and Waiver in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings," 23
Federal Probation 43 (1959). Mr. Sheridan is Chief, Technical Aid Branch, Division of
Juvenile Delinquency Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare.
17 People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W.2d 303 (1943).
Is Thurston, Concerning Juvenile Delinquency 147 (1942).
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'commitment' issued by the juvenile court fixes and determines punish-
ment for crime whether it is so designated or not .... ."' And a capable
investigator of the New York City court has reported: "There are
several judges who initiate use of temporary detention facilities in a
punishing way .... 1)20 When children are taken from their homes
and families and deprived of their liberty by incarceration in an institu-
tion, they are being punished. Furthermore, the degree of difference in
punishment between modern state penal farms or prisons and reforma-
tories for juveniles is negligible. Judge Anderson of Mississippi has
stated, "It cannot be said truthfully that the Industrial Training School
in this state is not a penal institute. It is as much a penal institution
as the modern, well-regulated, humanely managed penitentiary. Its in-
mates are restrained of their liberty of action, notwithstanding the pur-
pose of the law is to reform and educate them."'"
It should be recognized, too, that children are often incarcerated by
juvenile courts for far longer periods than would be meted out to an
adult criminal for the identical misdeed. To illustrate, when petit
larceny was punishable in California by a maximum six-month jail
sentence, a boy described as "under 18" was for such an act put away
until he was twenty-one.2 And, in Pennsylvania when petit larceny by
an adult was punishable at the most by a two year sentence, a child
was deprived of his liberty for such an act for seven years, that is, until
he reached his majority.2" Again, in South Carolina when the ordinary
sentence for petit larceny was thirty days, the Supreme Court of that
state upheld for such an act the commitment to the state industrial
school of boys eight and ten until they reached the age of twenty-one.
24
Furthermore, the record by now is abundantly clear that children are
being committed by juvenile courts on far less grounds than would
justify a criminal court in depriving an adult of his liberty. For instance,
a juvenile court judge removed a child from his parents and deprived
him of his liberty because he had driven a car without a license.25 In
another reported case, a juvenile court judge took a boy from his home
and sent him to the reformatory because he had accidentally discharged
19 Santillian v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 554, 557, 182 S.W.2d 812, 814 (1944).
20 Kahn, A Court for Children 268-69 (1953).
21 Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 433, 118 So. 184, 194 (1928) (dissenting). See also,
Rappeport, "Determination of Delinquency in the juvenile Court: A Suggested Approach,"
1958 Wash. U.L.Q. 123, 126; Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 10 (1949); Lindsey, "The
Legal Foundations of the jurisdiction, Powers, Organization and Procedure of the Courts
of Pennsylvania in Their Handling of Cases of Juvenile Offenders and of Dependent and
Neglected Children," 1926 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Sociql Sci-
ence 28.
22 Ex parte Nichols, 110 Cal. 651, 43 Pac. 9 (1896).
23 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198 (1905).
24 State v. Cagle, 111 S.C. 548, 96 S.E. 291 (1918).
25 In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
[Vol. 46
JUVENILE COURTS
a gun 20 How can we possibly justify the juvenile court judge who
sent away a girl because she had been raped and later seen "painted
and powdered up"?2 7 Consider further the justice of detaining a little
boy age seven in a city jail for several weeks (including the Christmas
holidays) for having put his hand under the skirt of a companion~8 The
reader might endeavor to project himself into the place of the parent
whose child was the innocent victim of an adult homosexual, for which
the youngster was put into a juvenile detention home and then sent away
to the reformatory.29 In still another instance we find an eight-year-old
child being removed from his family by the authorities and held in
detention simply so that he would be a handy witness for the police in
a criminal case.30
In the situations where it is necessary to separate a child from his
father or mother for the youth's protection, it is suggested that justice
would be far more effectively accomplished by incarcerating not the
child but the parent. What can be said of the "protection" theory when
a state permits girls under twenty-one to marry and thereafter continues
to expose them to the jurisdiction of juvenile courts? 31 Again, how de-
fensible is the "protection" theory when used by juvenile courts to justify
their usurpation of jurisdiction over adults because they committed some
misdeed when they were minors.32
Before the passage of the juvenile court acts it was everywhere well
established that minors accused of crime were entitled to all the con-
stitutional safeguards possessed by adults exposed to criminal prosecu-
tion.3 Even today when a minor can have his charges heard in the usual
adult criminal court, he is entitled to all the customary constitutional
rights.3 4 And when the person before the juvenile court is fortunate
enough to be an adult rather than a juvenile being "protected," he is
entitled to all constitutional protections. For instance, the United States
Supreme Court has held that an adult defendant before a juvenile court
26 State v. Butcher, 74 Utah 275, 279 Pac. 497 (1929).
27 People v. Fowler, 148 N.Y. Supp. 741 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1914), reversed on
other grounds, 166 App. Div. 605, 152 N.Y. Supp. 261 (1st Dept. 1915).
28 Reported by Fine, 1,000,000 Delinquents 285 (1955).
29 Reported by Diana, "The Rights of Juvenile Delinquents: An Appraisal of Juvenile
Court Procedures," 47 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 561, 566 (1957).
30 In re Singer, 134 Cal. App. 2d 547, 285 P.2d 955 (1955).
31 Stoker v. Gowans, 45 Utah 556, 147 Pac. 911 (1915); State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233,
56 So. 2d 242 (1951). And cf. In re Lundy, 82 Wash. 148, 143 Pac. 885 (1914).
32 Johnson v. State, 18 NJ. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955).
33 Commonwealth v. Horregan, 127 Mass. 450 (1879) (right to presentment by a grand
jury); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Ray 63 N.H. 406 (1885) (due process of law; right
to trial by jury); People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner 55 Ill. 280 (1870) (due process
of law).
34 Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Ex parte Rider, 50 Cal. App.
797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920).
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in the District of Columbia, charged with willfully neglecting or refusing
to support his children, which was punishable by fine or imprisonment
for not more than twelve months, was entitled to the preliminary of a
grand jury indictment before being brought to trial.3 5 Similarly, it has
been held that an adult accused of refusing to provide for his child
is entitled in a District of Columbia juvenile court to his constitutional
right to counsel under the sixth amendment.36 The state courts also
regularly acknowledge that adults tried before juvenile courts for child-
related offenses are entitled to all their constitutional rights. It is only
the child before the juvenile court who has suffered the bad bargain of
having traded precious constitutional rights for "protection."
If ever words have obscured issues of legal and constitutional right,
it is the unfortunate language of "non-criminal," "non-punishment" and
"protective" indulged in by the legislatures and the courts. It is under-
standable that a capable sociologist is aghast at "their free recourse
to ecstatic and unwarranted assumptions. ' 38  The record of juvenile
court judges and authorities is not such that we can safely go on theoriz-
ing that constitutional rights are unnecessary. It may be that the alarm-
ing recidivism of children exposed to the juvenile courts is due in part
at least to the kind of justice administered in these institutions. In
brief, this paper will urge that children accused of acts that would be
crimes if committed by adults are entitled as of constitutional right
in the juvenile courts to all constitutional safeguards recognized in that
jurisdiction to those charged with crimes in the usual criminal courts. The
proposition is already accepted by the better jurists. For instance, Judge
'Curran has indicated, "in the District of Columbia, where the charge in
the Juvenile Court is one of crime which, because of charitable considera-
tions for the welfare of the child, is called 'juvenile delinquency,' then it
must be surrounded by the guarantees and limitations of the Federal Con-
stitution."3 Additionally, it will be urged that even if a court should
refuse to recognize the punitive and criminal nature of the proceedings,
it must acknowledge that a child is being deprived of his liberty and
hence entitled as of constitutional right to due process of law under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and under the comparable due
35 United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
36 Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
37 State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142, 217 Pac. 705 (1923), holding unconstitutional an at-
tempt by a juvenile court judge to hear in chambers evidence that the adult had con-
tributed to the delinquency of a minor. See further People v. Budd, 24 Cal. App. 176,
140 Pac. 714 (1914); Pease v. State, 74 Ind. App. 572, 129 N.E. 337 (1921); State v.
Eisen, 53 Ore. 297, 99 Pac. 282 (1909).
38 Gels, "Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings," 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 101, 110,
n.39 (1957).
39 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D.D.C. 1955).
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process clauses in the state constitutions which, of course, apply to
"non-criminal" proceedings.
The Right to a Grand Jury Indictment as a Preliminary to Trial
Not all states provide for a constitutional right to indictment or pre-
sentment by a grand jury as a necessary preface to prosecution for
crime, and states that do not provide grand juries as a preliminary to
prosecution for crimes can not be expected to do this as a prelude to
proceedings in juvenile court. In the states having constitutional grand
jury indictment clauses, the cases are few and they are not agreed on
whether children can be brought before juvenile courts for what would
be indictable offenses without grand jury action. The Missouri Supreme
Court once held that a statute giving a probate court jurisdiction to deal
with juvenile offenders under seventeen was void when applied to such
a youth charged with petit larceny, since the act did not provide for
either the indictment or information required by the state constitution.4 °
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, has ruled that the constitu-
tional right to a grand jury indictment as a preliminary to prosecution
is inapplicable to juvenile court proceedings involving children charged
with misdeeds.4 Nevertheless, even in a state where the courts do not
consider the right applicable to juvenile court proceedings, it has been
ruled that a minor must be freed whenever the evidence against him is
insufficient to show reasonable or probable cause where on the same
facts an adult would be discharged on motion to quash the indictment
or information.' Since the United States Constitution does not require
any state to preface its criminal prosecutions by grand jury indictments
or presentments, 43 that document will not be interpreted to make such
a demand as a preliminary to juvenile court proceedings."
It cannot yet be said that the grand jury indictment clause of the
fifth amendment requires such a preliminary to juvenile proceedings
in the federal courts. If juveniles charged with what would be indictable
offenses are entitled to the right in federal courts, the right can be waived
in proceedings under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act by consent-
ing to the procedures of the Act.45
The Right to Bail
It would be unthinkable to urge that a legislature could circumvent
the constitutional right to bail where it exists by the simple expedient
40 State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028 (1914).
41 Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W. 643 (1915).
42 In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952).
43 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
44 Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (S.D. Ohio 1911).
45 52 State 765 (1938), 18. U.S.C. § 5032 (1958).
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of labelling the proceedings "non-criminal," and yet this is, in effect,
what the courts are permitting in denying the applicability of the con-
stitutional bail clauses to children incarcerated by juvenile authorities
in advance of their hearings. In a large city hundreds of children are
typically being detained pending their ultimate hearing and disposition.46
According to the United States Children's Bureau, twenty-five per cent
of the children picked up are detained in jails." And, as noted earlier,
the period of detention prior to their hearing can extend into months.48
Where a child is accused of crime in the usual courts he is, except for
a few of the most serious offenses, regularly accorded the constitutional
right to bail. He should have the same constitutional right when accused
of comparable misdeeds in juvenile courts. Illustratively, holding that
a statute creating juvenile courts could not take away a child's constitu-
tional right to bail, the Louisiana Supreme Court appropriately ob-
served, "Tribunals of this nature were established with the view of show-
ing more consideration to the juvenile and were not designed to deprive
him of any of his constitutional rights. '4 9 Judge Holtzoff of the District
Court for the District of Columbia has strongly stated that the constitu-
tional right to bail under the eighth amendment is applicable to all who
are deprived of their liberty and detained previous to trial, including
children picked up by juvenile authorities in the District."0 In England
bail is acknowledged as of right to children pending their hearings.5' Of
course, some parents have been to blame for their children's deviant
behavior and they may not be the best custodians in the world for the
children, 2 but, until the hearing is held and the juvenile court makes
its disposition, it is urged that the child belongs in his home and not
in a police lock-up, a county jail, or even a "detention center."
After a child has been adjudicated a delinquent in a proper proceed-
ing there is not, according to the weight of authority, any constitutional
right to bail pending disposition.53 However, should the child be trans-
46 Cf. In re Prieto, 49 N.Y.S.2d 800, 802 (Doam. Rel. Ct., Bronx County, 1944) (three
hundred and eight boys).
47 U.S. Dep't of Health Education and Welfare, Juvenile Court Statistics, 1946-49
(Children's Bureau Statistical Series #8, 1951).
48 Notes 3 & 4 supra.
49 State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 444, 12 So. 2d 211, 213 (1943).
50 Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960). However, note Cinque v. Boyd.
99 Conn. 70, 121 Ati. 678 (1923) for the suggestion that the constitutional right to bail
does not apply in juvenile court cases.
51 Henriques, "Children's Courts in England," 37 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 295, 296 (1946).
52 Cf. Paulsen, "Fairness to the juvenile Offender," 41 Minn. L. Rev. 547, 552 (1957).
53 Ex parte Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945); with which com-
pare Ex parte Osborne, 127 Tex. Crim. 136, 75 S.W.2d 265 (1934); In re Magnuson, 110
Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952); State v. Fullmer, 76 Ohio App. 335, 62 N.E.2d 268




ferred to a penitentiary for adult criminals, or any comparable institu-
tion, habeas corpus should be granted unless within a very brief period
the child is transferred to a more suitable institution.54
The Right to Know the Nature and the Cause of the Accusation
Most state constitutions contain clauses comparable to the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution, to the effect that all
persons accused of crime shall have the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them. 5 A court has occa-
sionally indicated that a minor brought before a juvenile court for some
misdeed is not entitled to this constitutional right, on its usual theory
that the youth was not charged with a "crime." 56 However, the better
view supported by the weight of authority is that a child brought before
a juvenile court for alleged misbehavior is entitled to a charge that is
reasonably definite 7 Writing of children before the juvenile courts, an
outstanding sociologist has said: "An almost universal handicap of the
child is his ignorance of the meaning of the charge and of his rights in
court; rarely is he appraised fully and intelligibly so as to remove his
childish misunderstanding and fears.)
5 8
The first essential of judicial fairness is that the person brought into
court be given a clear understanding of the claims of society against him.
Without this it is impossible to defend oneself. As of constitutional right,
either under specific "right-to-know" or general due process clauses, a
child brought before a juvenile court is entitled to a clear statement of
the nature and cause of the proceedings against him so that he can
prepare his defense.59 Since many children will be unable to comprehend
the accusation, this right must, of necessity, belong also to the child's
parents or guardians.
The Ban upon Double Jeopardy
The fifth amendment ban upon double jeopardy, binding upon the
federal government, should prevent subsequent criminal prosecution of
a minor after he has been exposed to a juvenile delinquency proceeding
by the federal government. Jeopardy has commenced when a person
is brought before any tribunal that can deprive him of his liberty: Judge
54 United States ex rel. Stinnett v. Hegstrom, 178 F. Supp. 17 (D. Conn. 1959); In re
Prieto, 49 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Doam. Rel. Ct., Bronx County, 1944).
55 E.g., Pa. Const., Art. I, § 9.
56 Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 AUt. 678 (1923).
57 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932); Ex parte Mei, 122,
NJ. Eq. 125, 192 Atl. 80 (1937).
58 Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 184 (1949).




Holtzoff of the District Court for the District of Columbia has ably
remarked:
Ineluctable logic leads to the conclusion that the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy, as is the case with the right of counsel and the
privilege against self-incrimination, is applicable to all proceedings, ir-
respective of whether they are denominated criminal or civil, if the outcome
may be deprivation of liberty of the person. Necessarily, therefore, this is
true of proceedings in the Juvenile Court. Precious constitutional rights can-
not be diminished or whittled away by the device of changing names of tri-
bunals or modifying the nomenclature of legal proceedings. The test must
be the nature and the essence of the proceeding rather than its title. If the
result may be a loss of personal liberty, the constitutional safeguards
apply.60
Even though courts-martial are not considered "criminal" in the usual
sense of the word, the United States Supreme Court long ago ruled
that the same sovereign could not expose a person to both court-martial
punishment and criminal prosecution for the same act.61 Analogously,
once the federal government has in a juvenile proceeding alleged par-
ticular misdeeds against a youth, it cannot fairly thereafter re-expose
him to prosecution in the usual criminal courts for the same misbehavior.
Under the fourteenth amendment the United States Supreme Court
has held that certain practices of the states were not the kind of double
jeopardy that is forbidden under the amendment's due process clause.2
It must then be accepted as still an open question whether the federal
constitution allows a state juvenile court to commit a youth and to
follow this with criminal court prosecution and sentencing for the one
misdeed.
Most state courts presently hold that the state constitutional bans
upon double jeopardy do not prevent later criminal prosecution for the
same misconduct after a minor has been exposed to juvenile court pro-
ceedings and disposition. 3 The customary explanation is that the ban
upon double jeopardy applies only to "criminal" cases, and juvenile
court proceedings are deemed to be something else. This position is
60 United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d
487 (D.C. Cir. 1959), 45 Va. L. Rev. 436 (1959). Without resolving the constitutional
question, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that jeopardy had not yet attached
at the preliminary hearing stage. 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
61 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
62 Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
63 People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); In re Santillanes,
47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); Dearing v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 6, 204 S.W.2d 983
(1947); State v. Smith, 75 N.D. 29, 25 N.W.2d 270 (1946); In re Smith, 114 N.Y.S.2d
673 (Dom. Rel. Court Kings County 1952). And cf. Matter of McDonald, 153 A.2d 651
(Mun. App. D.C. 1959). A few states have no express constitutional ban upon double
jeopardy and in these jurisdictions exposing a minor to juvenile court proceedings and




applied by these courts even when the youth is charged in juvenile court
with misconduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult.6
Under this approach youngsters have been incarcerated in "training
schools" and comparable institutions for as long as fifteen months and
then exposed to prosecution in the adult criminal court for the identical
offense that put them in the juvenile detention institution.65
The contrary and better view holds that once a child has been tried
and either acquitted or found to be a juvenile delinquent by a juvenile
court and given a commitment or "disposition," he cannot thereafter be
tried in the usual criminal courts for the same offense. In so holding,
a Texas court has said "In neither case can the party be convicted twice
for the same criminal act whether the result. of the conviction be to
denounce him as a delinquent or as a felon."66 The Pennsylvania courts
have also recognized the impropriety of turning over to the criminal
courts for prosecution a child who has earlier been committed for the
same conduct by a juvenile court. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that a juvenile court could not commit a youth to the state industrial
school and at the same time order him held for the grand jury for the
same act.67 More recently, the court has added "Furthermore, ordi-
narily, when the juvenile court assumes jurisdiction, makes an adjudica-
tion of delinquency and commits a child, it could not certify the case
to the court of quarter sessions for criminal prosecution based on the
same violations of law."6" This was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania which ruled that a certification by a juvenile court for trial
in an adult court "could not be made after the Juvenile Court had made
an adjudication of delinquency nor, perhaps, after any self-incriminatory
examination of the child. ' 69 The Standard Family Court Act provides
that "When a petition has been filed a child shall not thereafter be
subject to a criminal prosecution based on the facts giving rise to the
petition . . . ." The draftsman of the Act has made it clear that it
was not the intention to permit a juvenile court to try a child for alleged
delinquency and then at a later date waive the case to an adult court
for criminal prosecution for the same act.7 '
It is shocking to contemplate that, under the response of the majority
64 In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
65 People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); Sheridan, "Double
Jeopardy and Waiver in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 23 Fed. Prob. 43 (1959).
66 Van Hatten v. State, 97 Tex. Crin. 123, 125, 260 S.W. 581, 582 (1924).
67 Matter of Trignani, 150 Pa. Super. 491, 28 A.2d 702 (1942).
68 Matter of Holmes, 175 Pa. Super. 137, 144, 103 A.2d 454, 458 (1953).
69 Matter of Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 605, 109 A.2d 523, 526 (1954).
70 § 13.
T1 Sheridan, "Double Jeopardy and Waiver in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings," 23
Fed. Prob. 43-44 (1959).
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rule, a minor can be committed for many years by a juvenile court
judge, then prosecuted and sentenced by a state criminal court for the
identical misdeed, and later, for the original misconduct, exposed to
further "protection" by the juvenile court! These courts should be
urged to re-examine their position. Once a youth is exposed to a
judicial proceeding wherein his liberty can be lost he is in jeopardy,
regardless of how the proceeding is locally labelled. A minor is in
jeopardy the moment a juvenile court begins hearing his case.
The Right to a Speedy and Public Trial
It has not yet been made clear by the United States Supreme Court
that the right to a speedy trial is binding in the state courts and, con-
sequently, it cannot be said with assurance that the right under the fed-
eral constitution prevails in state juvenile court proceedings. In federal
juvenile courts the right to a speedy trial should prevail, either under
the specific clause of the sixth amendment or under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.
On their usual theory that this is a "non-criminal" proceeding, two
state courts have ruled that the right to a speedy trial under the state
constitutional safeguards does not apply in juvenile court proceedings. 7
2
It is urged that the cases are wrongly decided. All the powerful reasons
that have long justified the draftsmen of our constitutions in enshrining
the right to a speedy trial apply in cases where juveniles are accused of
misconduct. The threat of loss of their liberty should not indefinitely
hang over their heads. Furthermore, the possibility of losing witnesses
who might aid in their defense is fully as real and harmful here as in
the usual criminal prosecution. Clearly, it would seem that this con-
stitutional right would be violated if a juvenile court were to commit
a youth to a place of reform and then, months or even years later, turn
him over to the adult criminal court for prosecution for the original
wrong.
78
Again, on the basis of the customary "non-criminal" label, a number
of courts have held that the constitutional right to a public trial is not
applicable in juvenile court proceedings.7'4  To the extent that these
decisions take from the youngster or his parents and counsel the deci-
sion whether there should be a public trial, these are wrongly decided.
72 Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184, 2 Am. Rep. 388 (1870); Matter of Mont, 175 Pa.
Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954).
73 Sheridan, "Double jeopardy and Waiver in juvenile Delinquency Proceedings," 23
Fed. Prob. 43, 45 (1959).
74 White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121
Atl. 678 (1923); Matter of Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563 (1908); State v. Cronin,
220 La. 233, 56 So. 2d 242 (1951); Matter of Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460
(1954) ; Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
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Even if the proceedings should be locally labelled "non-criminal" the
fair trial concept inherent in due process of law demands that a youngster
should not be tried in camera over his opposition. The reasons are
persuasive. For instance, when a youth is charged with assault, a
member of the public may well step forward in the court and testify that
the minor was simply defending himself. Or other members of the
courtroom audience may volunteer that the complaining witnesses are
prevaricating. Indeed, this right is necessary to keep a healthy check
upon the juvenile court judges. Of such judges in New York City a
capable scholar has written: "Each of these men and women is the
monarch of the court while sitting on its bench. The proceedings of
the court are only rarely observed by critical eyes. The public is not
admitted. Lawyers infrequently appear .... Decisions are seldom ap-
pealed to higher courts that might admonish or correct." 5 Truly this
is not just a "legalistic" ritual magnified by the legal profession.
No minor before a juvenile court should be exposed to the gaze of
the community and the press if he does not so desire. It follows that
once the constitutional right to a public trial is acknowledged, it can
be waived by any youth who desires to be heard in private. Since the
purpose of the right is not to guarantee the community entertainment
or the press copy, but to protect the person charged with an offense
against the state, it is up to the person charged, and not the state, to
determine if the right to a public trial is to be dispensed with in the
particular case. In England, although the general public is ordinarily
not permitted to be present, the press is given the opportunity to at-
tend juvenile court proceedings, but prohibited from mentioning the
name of the minor or describing the youngster in such a way that
identification is possible."6
The Right to Trial by Jury
At the moment there is no federal constitutional right to trial by jury
in state courts and this, of course, embraces the juvenile courts.7 The
sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal prosecutions
does not, according to a federal dlst t court, assure a jury trial to a
minor before a federal juvenile court ZV
On the prevailing theory that juvenile court proceedings are "non-
criminal," most of the state courts that have ruled upon the question
have held that the state constitutional bills of rights guaranteeing trial
75 Gellhorn, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City 81 (1954). And see
Geis, "Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings," 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 101 (1957).
78 Henriques, "Children's Courts in England," 37 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 295 (1946).
7 Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899).
78 White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
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by jury in criminal cases are inapplicable to youngsters charged with
offenses before the juvenile courts.79 The prevailing view additionally
permits denial of a jury under the state constitutional clauses guarantee-
ing a right of trial by jury in civil proceedings."0 Some of these courts
have come to this conclusion by deciding that a juvenile court proceed-
ing does not amount to a "trial."' ' Additionally, a majority of the courts
that have passed upon the problem have concluded that a child before
a juvenile court is not entitled to this right under due process of law.82
Notwithstanding the above authority, it is urged that when children
are brought before juvenile courts for misdeeds that would require a
jury trial if the accused were an adult, such minors are entitled as of
right to trial by jury. There are well-reasoned state supreme court cases
recognizing the constitutional right of trial by jury when a youth is
charged with a specific wrong before a juvenile court. This is the
holding, for example, of the Iowa Supreme Court.' Further, at a
time when the Michigan juvenile court law allowed the judge to fine
minors up to twenty-five dollars for their peccadilloes, the Supreme
Court of that state properly concluded that the proceedings were "crimi-
nal" to which the constitutional safeguard of jury trial applied. 4 The
early decisions in Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania held that children before juvenile court judges were entitled to
the constitutional right of trial by jury" but, unfortunately, the later
cases have taken a contrary view.86 That the right to jury trial is con-
sidered both necessary and important is attested by the acts of the legis-
latures in almost half the states giving the right in juvenile court pro-
79 Matter of Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924); People v. Fifield, 136 Cal.
App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 At. 678 (1923);
Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32 (1953); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill.
328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913) ; Marlowe v. Commonwealth, -142 Ky. 106, 133 S.W. 1137 (1911) ;
Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928); Laurie v. State, 108 Neb. 239, 188
N.W. 110 (1922); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); Prescott v. State,
19 Ohio St. 184, 2 Am. Rep. 388 (1870); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl.
198 (1905); Commonwealth v. Carnes, 82 Pa. Super. 335 (1923); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah
473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907); In re Gomez, 113 Vt. 224, 32 A.2d 138 (1943).
80 Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (Ohio Cir. 1911); State v. Heath, 352 Mo. 1147,
181 S.W.2d 517 (1944); Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184, 2 Am. Rep. 388 (1870);
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 At. 198 (1905).
81 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Ati. 198 (1905).
82 In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209
Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1930); but compare with this State v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55
N.W.2d 565 (1952).
83 State v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952).
84 Robinson v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908).
85 People v. Turner, 55 II. 280, 8 Am. Rep. 645 (1870); State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406,
56 Am. Rep. 529 (1885); Matter of Daniecki, 117 N.J. Eq. 527, 177 At. 91 (1935), aff'd
119 N.J. Eq. 359, 183 Aft. 298 (1935); Matter of Mansfield, 22 Pa. Super. 224 (1903).
86 Lindsay v. Lindsay, supra note 79; Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra note 79; Peti-




ceedings.87 And in England all children over the age of fourteen charged
in the juvenile courts with what would be indictable offenses are ac-
corded the right of trial by jury.
88
Before the juvenile court acts in this country, children charged with
offenses before the regular courts were without question entitled to their
constitutional right to trial by jury, and, since it was hardly the in-
tent of the legislature to diminish the protections of the children by
the acts, the juvenile court statutes should be interpreted wherever
possible to admit this right. Any attempt by the legislature to take
away constitutional rights in this area should be invalidated.89 Once this
right is acknowledged, the doctrine of waiver can be applied so long as the
child has knowingly and intelligently effectuated the waiverY0
The Right of Confrontation
The sixth amendment right of confrontation is not applicable, accord-
ing to a federal district court, in federal juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings."' And the United States Supreme Court has not yet held that one
accused in the state courts is entitled to this right as part of due process
under the fourteenth amendment.9
Some state courts have ruled that the right of confrontation guaran-
teed in the state constitutions does not apply in juvenile court pro-
ceedings on their usual rationale that these are "non-criminal."93 In
these jurisdictions there is no constitutional objection to the use of
hearsay against a minor,9 and the courts have sometimes permitted ad-
judications of delinquency to be based upon hearsay.
The better and majority of cases, on the other hand, have held hearsay
inadmissible in juvenile court proceedings and have rejected findings
of delinquency when supported only by hearsay., For example, a Texas
87 Reckless & Smith, Juvenile Delinquency 227 (st ed. 1932). E.g, Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 22-8-2 (1953) ; Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 Pac. 718 (1928) ; D.C. Code Ann.
§ 11-915 (1951); Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 102 (1941); Ex parte Lewis, 85 Okla. Crim. 322,
188 P.2d 367 (1947); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2334 (Supp. 1950).
88 Henriques, "Children's Courts in England," 37 J. Crim. L., C. & P.. 295, 296 (1946);
Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 205 (1949).
89 "The rights of the individual guaranteed by the constitution cannot be determined
by the criterion of whether we think them useful or otherwise." Brickley, J., dissenting
in In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 169, 138 P.2d 503, 521 (1943).
90 Ex parte Baeza, 185 P.2d 242 (Okla. Crim. 1947). In proceedings under the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act, 62 Stat. 857 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1951), juveniles can
waive their right to trial by jury by consenting to procedures under the Act.
91 White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
92 Cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
93 Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 AUt. 678 (1923).
94 Matter of Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
95 In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (Mun. App. D.C. 1953); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d
787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952); Krell v. Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954); People




court has concluded, "The accused in such cases should be faced by
the witnesses who give evidence against him and should be permitted
to hear such evidence and have an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses."96 The statement by a California appellate court is equally
appropriate: "[D]etails whispered privately to a judge in chambers
cannot be the basis of a final order. The more serious the accusation
the greater the need that it be carefully tested, and to that end that
no one be denied the right of cross-examination." 2 According to the
New York Court of Appeals, "Hearsay, opinion, gossip, bias, prejudice,
trends of hostile neighborhood feeling, the hopes and fears of social
workers, are all sources of error and have no more place in Children's
Court than in any other court. 9 8 To this the Nebraska Supreme Court
adds,
Reports of an ex parte investigation made by investigators from the police
department and the Child Welfare Department are not competent evidence
and may not be considered by the court in the hearing and decision of a
disputed issue of fact.99
Recently, the same court ruled that a juvenile court judge cannot con-
sider statements made out of court, nor can he hear testimony or conduct
part of the hearing out of the presence of the juvenile. This court
pointed out in unmistakable terms that the language, "to hear and dis-
pose of the case in a summary manner," typical of the juvenile court
statutes, "did not mean that trials could be had in any court in such
manner as to destroy the traditional and constitutional safeguards of a
trial. The Legislature did not intend that trials should be had with-
out the benefit of testimony of witnesses given under the sanction of
oath or affirmation. It did not mean to say that the liberty of a child
has less sanctity than that of an adult." 00
Capable commentators have made the point that confrontation is an
imperative in juvenile court proceedings if justice is to be done. The
late Dean Wigmore wrote: "But that the judge shall have the power
to commit to long detention any person without giving the person any
opportunity to hear the substance of the testimony against him is funda-
mentally unsound and practically dangerous."' 0 ' A distinguished jurist
98 Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). And see State v. TIncher,
258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028, 1033 (1914); Green v. State, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647
(1952).
97 In re Hill, 247 Pac. 591, 692-93 (Cal. App. 1926).
98 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932). North Dakota courts have
used similar language. See State v. Schelin, 59 N.D. 386, 230 N.W. 9 (1930); followed in
Matter of Rixen, 74 N.D. 80, 19 N.W.2d 863 (1945).
99 Ripley v. Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 247, 63 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1954).
100 Nebraska v. Bartkus, 168 Neb. 257, 263, 95 N.W.2d 674, 677 (1959).
101 5 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1400, at 145 (3d ed., 1940).
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comments in similar vein: "If hearsay, for example, has not been found
justly admissible in civil disputes and criminal trials, it is no better in
juvenile court proceedings."" 2 And Sheldon Glueck, who has ably
studied the approaches of the law to juvenile misbehavior, has recently
observed: "Loftiness of the motives of a juvenile court can be an in-
sufficient exchange for hearsay or neighborhood gossip or the inability
of the child to examine the witnesses from whom the social investigator
obtained his information."'0 3 In a society that long ago deliberately
rejected the inquisitorial method and freely chose the alternative of
confrontation and cross-examination by adversary counsel in its search
for the truth, there is neither justification nor excuse for the deprivation
of liberty to a single child when supported only by the utterances not
under oath of persons never subjected to court-room confrontation and
cross-examination. Either under the specific bill-of-rights safeguards,
or under due process of law in the federal and state constitutions, a
youth must be given the right to confront and cross-examine those who
would prove him a delinquent. Because parents or guardians are there-
with being deprived of the care and companionship of the child, they,
too, should perforce be recognized as possessing these rights.
The Right to Have Compulsory Process to Compel the Attendance of
Witnesses
The sixth amendment guarantees that every accused shall enjoy the
right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,"
and most state constitutions have comparable provisions. On two occa-
sions courts have suggested that the right does not prevail in juvenile
court proceedings on the predictable theory that these are "non-crimi-
nal.' 04  The courts should repudiate these views and, admitting the
criminal nature of the proceedings rule that this right spelled out in
the bills of right applies here. But even if a court should refuse to
acknowledge the criminal nature of the court proceedings, it should
understand that even parties in civil litigation require compulsory
process to present their positions and should hold that due process,
clearly applicable to civil proceedings, demands a fair opportunity to
present one's defense. It is impossible to have one's day in court with-
out the opportunity to produce favorable witnesses. The right to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses is acknowl-
102 Waite, "How Can Court Procedures Be Socialized Without Impairing Individual
Rights:," 12 J. Am. Inst. Crim L. & C. 339, 343 (1922).
103 Glueck, The Problem of Delinquency 327 (1959).




edged in the better juvenile courts" 5 and it should be recognized every-
where.
The Right to Counsel
Once incarceration of children for their misdeeds is recognized as a
criminal proceeding though conducted by juvenile courts, juveniles will
be accorded their right to counsel under the criminal safeguard sections
of the federal and state constitutions. The sixth amendment will then
guarantee the right to counsel in federal juvenile courts. The fourteenth
amendment will guarantee children before state juvenile courts the right
to counsel when to deny them counsel would in effect deny them a fair
trial.101 Already a federal court, in a well-reasoned opinion, has held
by way of statutory interpretation that a youth charged in a federal
juvenile court with an offense that would be a crime if committed by an
adult is entitled to be advised that he has a right to counsel. Further-
more, the court indicated that the legislature could not have deprived
the youth of his pre-existing constitutional rights, including the right
to counsel when tried in a federal court. Referring to the juvenile court
act, the court stated:
It follows logically that in the absence of such legislation, the juvenile
would be entitled to the same constitutional guarantees and safeguards as
an adult. If this be true then the only possible reason for the Juvenile
Court Act was to afford the juvenile safeguards in addition to those he al-
ready possessed. The legislative intent was to enlarge, not to diminish these
protections. 07
When a child was confined to a "juvenile hall" under commitment issued
out of a juvenile court and accused of doing an act that was a felony
under state law, a California appellate court held that he had a right
to counsel under that State's constitutional clause giving right to counsel
"in criminal prosecutions."' The contrary holdings to the effect that
the right to counsel is inapplicable in juvenile courts are based again
on the theory that these proceedings are "non-criminal."' 0 9
Even the courts that label juvenile court proceedings as "non-criminal"
must face the demands of federal and state due process. It is incontro-
vertible that a child is a "person" and hence entitled to due process
105 Gellhorn, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City, 78 (1954).
106 Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
107 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.D.C. 1955).
108 Matter of Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920). And see Matter of Hill,
78 Cal. App. 23, 247 Pac. 591 (1926); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d
631 (1952).
109 White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954); In re Shaeffer, 126 A.2d 870 (Mun.
App. D.C. 1956); People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955); Matter of
McDermott, 77 Cal. App. 109, 246 Pae. 89 (1927); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 At].
678 (1923); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) (dissent by Musmanno, J.).
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under the fifth amendment and the state constitutions in state juvenile
courts. A fair trial in juvenile court proceedings requires that a child
have counsel by his side. Indeed, the right of a prosperous youth to
hire such counsel is everywhere acknowledged. 110 The right must in-
clude the right of an indigent juvenile to have counsel appointed for
him by the state that alleges he is delinquent. Judge Curran of the
District Court for the District of Columbia has held "that where the
child commits an act, which act if committed by an adult would consti-
tute a crime, then due process in the Juvenile Court requires that the
child be advised that he is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel,
and this is so even though the juvenile court in making dispositions of
delinquent children is not a criminal court.""' And the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia stated:
Since an intelligent exercise of the juvenile's rights under the Act and the
Rules clearly requires skills not possessed by the ordinary child under 18,
it is plain that, as appellee, the District of Columbia, concedes, a juvenile
is entitled to be represented by counsel if he or his parents or guardian
choose to furnish one. Appellee contends, however, that the court is not
required to advise a juvenile of that right, or to assure itself that the right
has been intelligently waived. It also contends that the court is not required
to appoint counsel where there is no such waiver or where the juvenile's
family is indigent. We think these contentions are unsound. 12
The court preferred to avoid the constitutional issue by basing its de-
cision upon statutory interpretation, but the language is equally per-
suasive in determining the need for recognition of this constitutional
right when a juvenile court statute cannot be so interpreted. For "Even
in purely civil proceedings the constitutional right of counsel applies if
the result may be a deprivation of freedom of the individual."" 3 There
is no doubt that the right to counsel includes the right of the minor to be
advised by the court of such right."4
The better reasoned state court opinions similarly acknowledge the
youth's right to counsel. Often the courts avoid the constitutional issues
and reach this result by "interpreting" the juvenile court acts. In so
doing, for example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has recently
noted that "a concomitant of an opportunity to be heard in support of
or in defense of a claim is the right to the assistance of counsel."" 5 Both
110 People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955); Shioutakon v. District
of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
"'I In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D.D.C. 1955).
112 Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
113 United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C. 1958), reversed on other
grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
114 McBride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
115 In re Poulin 100 N.H. 458, 459, 129 A.2d 672, 673 (1957).
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New York and California cases indicate that there is a constitutional right
of a child to counsel in the juvenile courts when to deny counsel is in
effect to deny a fair trial.1 "
Capable observers are almost unanimously agreed that the child must
be entitled to counsel. "In the absence of counsel," writes Tappan, "there
is no assurance that the child will be heard at all fully." 1 And on another
occasion he has written of girls brought before the juvenile courts:
There should be an attorney for the defense in the Court at all times to
give legal guidance and advice to the girl. This is the minimal requirement
for fair adjudication. If . . . the defendant is to be deprived of a large
section of her traditional right of due process by permitting communication
to the judge of the information and misinformation gleaned from gossip, of
community opinion, unthoughtful and often unfriendly neighbors and rela-
tives, there must be an opportunity for an attorney representing the de-
fendant to bring into the open the source and nature of the evidence so that
where the source is of inferior credibility little weight will be attached to
it."1
8
Other authorities are in substantial agreement." 9 While the aid of counsel
may prevent unwise commitment of a child, there is in the record of the
bar not the slightest basis for the fear of some lay judges and social
workers that the purpose of the juvenile court acts will be thwarted by
the presence of these officers of the court. "The worthwhile objectives of
the juvenile courts can be accomplished without prohibiting the child or
the parent from obtaining the assistance of counsel."'"
Although it acknowledges "the child's right to counsel . . . in all
juvenile court proceedings, including preliminary conferences," the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently ruled
that the right did not apply at a time when the juvenile court judge was
deciding whether to waive the case over to the usual criminal courts.' 2 '
The right to counsel can be waived by parties possessing the right. How-
ever, only intelligent and competent waivers can be accepted by the
courts. Most minors brought before juvenile courts may well lack the
competence and intelligence to give effective waivers of the right to
counsel. "It seems to me to follow as a matter of law," says one court,
"that a boy of seventeen cannot competently waive his right to counsel
in a criminal case."' 2 There is no reason to believe that the same boy
116 People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956); People v. James, - N.Y.2d
-, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1961).
117 Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 216 (1949).
118 Tappan, Delinquent Girls in Court 107-08 (1947).
119 Paulsen, "Fairness to the Juvenile Offender," 41 Minn. L. Rev. 547, 570 (1957); Fine,
1,000,000 Delinquents 287 (1955).
120 In re Poulin, 100 N.H. 458, 129 A.2d 672, 673 (1957).
121 United States v. Stevenson, 170 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1959).
122 Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1944). See also McBride v. Jacobs,
247 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1957); In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (Mun. App. D.C. 1953).
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or his more youthful companions can any more competently waive the
right in juvenile court proceedings, and courts should not lightly conclude
that they have.
The Privilege Against Self Incrimination
It is fully established in all American jurisdictions that, notwithstand-
ing the limitative language of the constitutional provisions providing a
privilege against self incrimination, it is available of right not only in the
criminal courts but in any proceeding of that jurisdiction where the effect
of the utterance is to expose the speaker to later punishment in the courts
of that jurisdiction. Where a juvenile court judge can compel incrim-
inating statements from a youth and then turn him over to the adult
criminal court for prosecution, it is clear that he has been denied this
constitutional privilege.12 8 Any other rule would be unthinkable, permit-
ting juvenile authorities to grill children in ways the police cannot. The
Texas Court has ruled further that it is not enough that the juvenile court
statute provide by way of immunity that evidence given in a juvenile
court proceeding is inadmissible in any other court; to be constitutional
the statute must give an absolute immunity if the child is to be forced to
incriminate himself by the juvenile authorities.' Legislatures have un-
derstood the impropriety of using elsewhere such statements forced from
the child. Today statutes in some thirty-eight jurisdictions prohibit the
use of evidence given by a youth in juvenile court in any other tribunal. 25
An occasional court has deemed constitutional an interpretation of such
statutes which would allow the child to be charged in another court for
the identical misdeed but permit the charge to be proved only by evi-
dence other than that given by the youth before the juvenile court.' 26 The
better rule prevents transfer of the child over to the adult courts for
trial once incriminating statements of the child have been heard in
juvenile court unless there has been an intelligent and competent waiver
of the privilege against self incrimination by the youth.
12 7
The privilege against self incrimination should permit a child to re-
main silent when being exposed to a finding of delinquency by juvenile
authorities, and it should require that he be informed of his right by the
juvenile court before being questioned by the judge or any officer of
such court. There are well-reasoned decisions to the effect that a child is
123 Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944); In re Sadlier, 97 Utah 291,
85 P.2d 810, aff'd on rehearing, 97 Utah 313, 94 P.2d 161 (1939).
124 Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
125 E.g., Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-8-1 (1953). Sheridan, "Double Jeopardy and Waiver
in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings," 23 Fed. Prob. 43, 44 (1959).
128 Kozler v. New York Tel. Co., 93 NJ.L. 279, 108 AUt. 375 (1919). Annot. 147 A.L.R.
443 (1943).
127 Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 601, 104 A.2d 523, 526 (1954).
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"incriminating" himself when his responses expose him to incarceration
and loss of liberty through an adjudication of delinquency. A California
appellate court has freed on habeas corpus a boy committed for refusing
as a witness in juvenile court to answer certain questions upon the advice
of his counsel. Said this court:
It would have been strange, indeed, if the Legislature had sought to visit
a minor with the loss of his natural parent's society, guidance and gov-
ernance merely because, forsooth, he had the temerity to invoke the pro-
tection of a constitutional guaranty included in the state's organic law for
the very purpose of safeguarding his personal liberty against the methods
that obtained when confessions were extorted by inquisitorial abuses....
[T]he liberty of a ward of the juvenile court . . . cannot be further re-
strained, as, for example, by confinement in a public institution, solely
and simply because the ward chooses to stand steadfastly by a right
guaranteed him by the fundamental law of the state.1
28
Again, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a girl under eighteen
could refuse to testify to her relations with an adult male when her
answers might expose her to an adjudication of delinquency by a juvenile
court: "If the concept of criminality arises only because of an arbitrary
age limit fixed by statute, then it is all the more important that the
juvenile should be entitled to and be protected in the right to the privi-
lege of silence where his statement, if made, might be self-incrimi-
nating."'1 29 Furthermore, in those jurisdictions where juries are used in
juvenile court proceedings, it has been held that youths are entitled to
instructions from the court that the jury is to draw no unfavorable in-
ference from the child's reluctance to take the witness stand.' 0
There have been some state court decisions to the effect that the
instant constitutional right does not belong to children in juvenile court
on the usual "non-criminality" theory with the consequence that children
can be forced to acknowledge their wrongs. 8' Not only is the labelling
unrealistic and unreasonable but, as pointed out above, the privilege is
not restricted to "criminal" prosecutions but is regularly available in
other inquiries by the state. No child taken before juvenile authorities
should be compelled to say that he has committed misdeeds that would
justify a juvenile court in removing him from his parents and society.
128 In re Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 761, 189 Pac. 804, 807 (1920).
129 In re Sadleir, 97 Utah 291, 302, 85 P.2d 810, 815, aff'd on rehearing, 97 Ufah/313,
94 P.2d 161 (1939).
130 In re Davis, 83 A.2d 590 (Mun. App. D.C. 1951).
131 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932) (dissent by Crane, I.: "The
accused having been forced to be a witness against himself, was sent away to be locked
up on his own testimony. This was in direct violation of the Constitution of this state...."
260 N.Y. at 184, 183 N.E. at 358) ; In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947) ;
Re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109
A.2d 523 (1954) (dissent by Musmanno, 3.); Mont Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d




Due Process of Law-Notice and Hearing
When the liberty of a child is being abridged by juvenile courts he is
entitled to constitutional due process." Such liberty is clearly taken
away by the state when children are removed from their families and
homes, deprived of freedom of movement, and incarcerated by the
state.'33 "It is true," admits a federal court, "that in both juvenile court
and criminal proceedings a person may be deprived of his liberty."' 34
Comparably the Washington Supreme Court has ruled that when the
police took a minor into custody for alleged misbehavior they were de-
priving the youth of his liberty, and when they failed to follow applicable
local procedures they were taking his liberty without due process, making
them liable in damages for false imprisonment. 3 5 Not only does due
process extend to children before juvenile courts but to their parents and
guardians as well where the state is endeavoring to deprive them of the
custody and companionship of their child. 36 The right of a child before
a juvenile court to fair treatment was emphasized by the late Chief
Justice Vanderbilt:
In their zeal to care for children neither juvenile judges nor welfare workers
can be permitted to violate the Constitution, especially the Constitutional
provisions as to due process that are involved in moving a child from its
home. The indispensable elements of due process are: first, a tribunal with
jurisdiction; second, notice of a hearing to the proper parties; and finally,
a fair hearing. All three must be present if we are to treat the child as an
individual human being and not to revert, in spite of good intentions, to
the more primitive days when he was treated as a chattel.'37
The first demand of due process in a juvenile court proceeding requires
that the minor and his parents or guardians be given clear notice of the
alleged misbehavior with adequate specificity and ample time to prepare
their defense to the state's allegations.3 In requiring that parents and
guardians be given timely notice of the charge against the child and a
reasonable opportunity to defend, the Nebraska Court has explained,
132 Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959); In re Alexander, 152 Cal. App.
2d 458, 313 P.2d 182 (1957). Capello, "Due Process in the Juvenile Courts," 2 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 90 (1952).
133 In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 907, 62 N.W.2d 308, 311 (1954). See notes, 45 Ky LJ.
532, 535 (1957); 35 Va. L. Rev. 1097 (1949).
134 White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D.D.C. 1954).
135 Weber v. Doust, 81 Wash. 668, 143 Pac. 148 (1914).
136 In re Moilanen, 104 Cal. App. 2d 835, 233 P.2d 91 (1951); Pettit v. Engelking, 260
S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
137 Virtue, Basic Structure of Children's Services in Michigan p. x. (1953).
138 In re Florence, 47 Cal. 2d 25, 300 P.2d 825 (1956); In re Creely, 70 Cal. App. 2d
186, 190, 160 P.2d 870, 872 (1945); In re -Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 101 N.E.2d 192, 193
(1951) ; O'Leary, petitioner, 325 Mass. 179, 182, 89 N.E.2d 769, 771 (1950) ; State ex rel.
Cave v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028 (1914); State v. Andersen, 159 Neb. 601, 68
N.W.2d 146 (1955); In re Roth, 158 Neb. 789, 64 N.W.2d 799 (1954); In re Poulin, 100
N.H. 458, 459, 129 A.2d 672, 673 (1957); Matter of Solberg, 52 N.D. 518, 203 N.W. 898
(1925) ; Pettit v. Engelking, 260 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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"Without that protection a child of tender years could well become the
victim of the merciless and be deprived of the constitutional and tradi-
tional safeguards which are guaranteed to even society's most depraved
adult. Such a situation would be intolerable."' 39
At times juvenile court acts have been interpreted as not requiring that
informations used against juveniles charge the offense with the same
particularity as for adults charged with crimes.14 These interpretations
are unsound. If anything, the immature minor should be informed of
his purported wrongs with greater particularity so that no magnified
fears be engendered in the mind of the child.
The second due process right of the child and the parent in a juvenile
court is the right to a fair and adequate hearing. Every person, even in
"non-criminal" litigation, is entitled to his day in court. So, where a
probate judge with juvenile court jurisdiction had a boy brought in, then
told him to leave the judge's chambers while the judge told the father
he was sending away the boy and actually sent off the boy without a
hearing in open court of any kind, an Indiana court readily found due
process of law had been denied:
The petition reveals a star chamber proceeding... without a semblance of
due process.... [T]he (Juvenile Court) act does not, nor could it, within
constitutional limitations, sanction the action of a court in finding a juve-
nile guilty of a wrong against the state in disregard of his rights to a hear-
ing in which he is apprised of the charges against him, the evidence in
support thereof and afforded an opportunity to defend himself.141
The right to a fair hearing embraces the right of the child and its
parents to be in court when the evidence is introduced against them, and
the further right of a reasonable opportunity to rebut such evidence. 142
To avoid passing on the constitutional issues, courts typically construe
the juvenile court acts to give the child the indicated rights.
14 3
The right to due process of law in its particular demand for a fair
hearing requires that the evidence against the youth be introduced in
open court and that it consist only of evidence found over the years to
139 In re Roth, 158 Neb. 789, 794, 64 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1954). And see In re Santil-
lanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); In re Smith, 92 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Children's Ct. Erie
County 1949) (notice to the parent is necessary before his child can be sent from an agency
home to a state training school).
140 State v. Johnson, 196 Iowa 300, 194 N.W. 202 (1923); Rose v. State, 137 Tex. Crim.
316, 129 S.W.2d 639 (1939). A few cases have mistakenly suggested that because the pro-
ceedings were "non-criminal" notice to the parents was unnecessary. Mill v. Brown, 31
Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907). Professor Clark has.written: "[I]t would seem that serious
constitutional questions are raised [by lack of notice] at least where the decree affects
the parents' custody of their child, perhaps in all cases." "Juvenile Delinquency in Colorado:
The Law's Response to Society's Need," 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1958).
141 Matter of Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 86-87, 108 N.E.2d 647, 649-50 (1952).
142 State v. Reister, 80 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1956); State v. Schelin, 59 ND. 386, 391, 230
N.W. 9, 11 (1930); followed in Matter of Rixen, 74 N.D. 80, 19 N.W.2d 863 (1945).
143 Weiss v. Ussery, 265 Ala. 510, 92 So.2d 916 (1957).
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be reliable. Hearsay, rumors, gossip, ex parte reports by persons not
sworn in court, etc., have no more place in juvenile court proceedings
than in any other judicial hearing. The important constitutional right to
have evidence against one introduced under oath in open court when the
minor and his parents are there to watch the witness and to rebut the
testimony is not to be taken away even by well-meaning juvenile court
judges in the name of "protecting" the child.'44 Visits in chambers where
neighbors, police and others impart information and misinformation to
the juvenile court judge without oath or the presence of the child are
too fraught with peril to condone. An attorney with an extensive ex-
perience in juvenile court matters and sympathetic to the place of these
courts has candidly admitted that "The danger that an informal hearing
might degenerate into a 'star chamber inquisition,' where orders are
made without proper evidence, is all too real, and must definitely be
guarded against.""'
There are some decisions allowing juvenile courts to brand children
as delinquents on the basis of hearsay. Thus, a Pennsylvania juvenile
court judge permitted a detective to testify that a boy had participated
in a robbery on the basis of the signed "confession" of another boy. The
confessor was not in court and the "confession" was not even introduced.
Indeed, the youngster who allegedly gave the "confession" repudiated it
at a later hearing. What was referred to naively as "the legalistic fea-
tures of the rules of evidence" could be avoided in holding the child a
delinquent according to the Pennsylvania court." It is shocking to find
a court negating constitutional rights to confrontation and due process
of law "to accomplish the purposes for which juvenile court legislation
is designed.' 147 Fortunately, the better-reasoned and majority of cases
are contra.148 And capable sociologists have seen the need for the tradi-
tional tests for truth and urged that juveniles be given a fair hearing
from which prejudicial, immaterial and hearsay evidence is excluded.
49
In England the rules of evidence in the juvenile courts are the same as
in the traditional adult tribunals' 5 and there is no persuasive reason why
American courts should permit a distinction.
144 In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (Mun. App. D.C. 1953).
_45 Waybright, A Proposed Juvenile Court Act for Florida, Juvenile Court Program of
Florida A. & M. University 1, 29 (1957). And see Ford v. State, 122 Ind. App. 315, 104
N.E.2d 406 (1952); Ripley v. Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 63 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1954).
146 Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 606, 109 A.2d 523, 526 (1954).
147 Ibid.
148 In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171,
177, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932); 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1400 (3d ed. 1940); Waite, "How
Far Can Court Procedures Be Socialized Without Impairing Individual Rights?," 12 J. Am.
Inst. Crim. L. & C. 339, 343 (1922).
149 Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 215 (1949).
150 Henriques, Children's Courts in England, 37 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 295, 296 (1946).
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Due process of law demands that the particular misbehavior alleged
to constitute juvenile delinquency be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
151
Some courts have settled for the quantum of proof used in civil litigation,
that is, proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 52 Not only must the
offense be clearly proved, but it must be proved, according to the weight
of authority, by good and competent evidence with true probative
value. 53 The prevailing rule has been well-expressed by the New York
Court of Appeals:
[T]he charge against the child cannot be sustained upon mere hearsay or
surmise; the child must first have committed the act of burglary or of
larceny before it can be convicted of being a delinquent child .... When,
therefore, a child is arrested and charged with being a delinquent child
because it has committed an offense which would be a crime in an adult,
that offense must be proved, and proved by competent evidence.
154
Due process of law is clearly violated when a juvenile court adjudicates
a child a delinquent solely on the basis of an involuntary confession ex-
tracted from the youth by force or coercion.' 55
A child before a juvenile court, alleged to have committed particular
wrongs, is entitled to the presumption of innocence accorded by the law
to inveterate adult wrongdoers.' 56 In England juveniles before the chil-
dren's courts are entitled to the full normal trial rights of the criminal
law, specifically including the presumption of innocence and the require-
ment that the charge be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 In this
country these should be accepted as constitutional rights.
The Sentence and Punishment
Since the federal constitution is not violated if a state judge considers
for the purpose of fixing sentence materials not introduced into evidence
at the trial, 5 ' it is seemingly constitutional for juvenile court judges to
use, solely for the determination of a proper disposition and after a
151 In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953); People v. Pikunas, 260 N.Y. 72, 182
N.E. 675 (1932); In re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y. Supp. 765 (3d Dep't 1931);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946); Note, 35 Va. L. Rev. 1097
(1949).
152 United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1957); State v. Superior
Court, 139 Wash. 1, 245 Pac. 409 (1926).
153 In re Davis, 83 A.2d 590 (Mun. App. D.C. 1951); Holden v. Smith, 135 Miss. 322,
100 So. 27 (1924); In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954); People v. Pikunas,
260 N.Y. 72, 182 N.E. 675 (1932); In re Gonzalez, 328 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
State v. Butcher, 74 Utah 275, 279 Pac. 497 (1929). Contra, Campbell v. Siegler, 10 N.J.
Misc. 987, 162 Ad. 154 (1932).
154 People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 313, 155 N.E. 584, 587 (1927).
155 People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927); In re Davis, 83 A.2d 590
(Mun. App. D.C. 1951). Compare People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932),
sustaining a commitment where the finding of delinquency was based solely on a youth's
confession in children's court without any warning of his privilege against self incrimination.
156 People v. Fowler, 148 N.Y. Supp. 741, 746 (Bronx County Ct. 1914).
157 Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 205 (1949).
158 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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finding of delinquency at a fair tifal, such matters as probation reports,
conclusions of psychiatrists, etc." 9
An occasional state court has refused to protect children committed by
juvenile courts under the constitutional bans on cruel and unusual punish-
ment, on a theory that the children were not being "punished."' 60 More
reasonably, when a juvenile court imposed a sentence upon a youth for
a definite span of years, the Arkansas Supreme Court readily found
"punishment." "The evident purpose of the order here under review was
to punish the delinquent. He was sentenced to the institution to which
juvenile felons may be sent, and for the definite period of three years,
which is a sentence that might have been imposed upon a conviction
before a jury for the crime of arson."''
Even where courts have not yet specifically held the constitutional ban
upon cruel and unusual punishment is binding upon the juvenile courts
in their "dispositions," a comparable end is frequently attained by ap-
pellate courts setting aside or reducing the commitments imposed by the
juvenile courts.6 2 Orders and commitments of juvenile courts have also
been restricted by the state constitutional freedom and establishment of
religion clauses. For instance, when a juvenile court dealt with two boys
who had thrown rocks at a dwelling by placing them on probation for a
year and ordering them to attend Sunday school and church every Sun-
day for the year, the Virginia court voided that part of the judgment as
contrary to the minors' constitutional rights. 63
Juvenile courts have been allowed to commit children for far longer
terms than either they or adults could be sentenced for in the customary
adult criminal court for that act.1 Furthermore, state constitutional bans
upon involuntary servitude have been deemed not violated by juvenile
court orders committing children to various institutions. 6 ' The argu-
ment seems to be that "The provisions of the Constitution with reference
to involuntary servitude, do not have reference to legitimate authority
for the control and education of children." 6 Whatever commitment is
159 In re Gonzalez, 328 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). Note, "Correct Use of Back-
ground Reports in Juvenile Delinquency Cases," 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 67 (1953).
160 Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931).
161 Underwood v. Farrell, 175 Ark. 217, 219, 299 S.W. 5, 6 (1927). A fortiori, the courts
will find "punishment" when the juvenile is sent to a jail or prison. White v. Reid, 125
F. Supp. 647, 650-51 (D.D.C. 1954). Note too People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill.
280 (1870).
162 E.g., In re Kroll, 43 A.2d 706 (Mun. App. D.C. 1945); Underwood v. Farrell, 175
Ark. 217, 299 S.W. 5 (1927).
163 Jones v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 679, 36 S.E.2d 571 (1946).
164 Ex parte Nichols, 110 Cal. 651, 43 Pac. 9 (1896); People v. Scherbing, 93 Cal. App.
736, 209 P.2d 796 (1949); State v. Cagle, 111 S.C. 548, 96 S.E. 291 (1918); Commonwealth
v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Adt. 198 (1905).
165 In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
16 Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 423, 118 So. 184, 191 (1928).
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made to "reform" the child clearly must be terminated when the prisoner
is no longer a child, that is, when he attains his majority.
167
Some courts have allowed juvenile court judges to revoke the proba-
tion of children without further notice or hearing and send them off to
institutions.168 The better cases are contra. Thus, in North Dakota the
court has ruled that where, after a juvenile court hearing, the child was
put in the custody of his father, the judge could not thereafter take away
the child and dispatch him to a training school without further notice
and hearing.169 And it has been judicially suggested that the decision to
revoke probation is not to be made without weighty reasons. So, the
Utah Court states, "once a child is allowed to leave the institution for
rehabilitation or because he appears already to have been rehabilitated,
the authorities must have good reason for returning him to the institu-
tion."'7 °
CONCLUSION
The constitutional issues herein indicated will probably be avoided in
the future as they have been in the past by judicial interpretation of the
juvenile court acts so as to recognize the fundamental rights enumerated.
Previous to these statutes juveniles brought to trial were accorded all the
constitutional safeguards incident to criminal prosecutions and it seems
reasonable to suppose that "The legislative intent was to enlarge, not to
diminish, these protections."'
7'
It should be apparent by now that the judicial negation of the consti-
tutional rights indicated herein on theories that the proceedings are
somehow "non-criminal" and the children are not really being "punished,"
illustrates the jurisprudence of appellation at its most superficial. For
example, what can be said in defense of a court that piously professes
children are not being punished by juvenile courts in the state, when
these same courts find their authority in a legislative act "Defining
Juvenile Delinquents, Providing for their Punishment"? 7 2 Capable courts
and judges have continuously exposed the unreason of this labelling
process:
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be
a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime, never-
theless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, representing a
167 Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931).
168 Ex parte Hollowell, 84 Okla. Crim. 355, 182 P.2d 771 (1947).
169 In re Rixen, 74 N.D. 80, 19 N.W.2d 863 (1945).
170 Ex parte S.H., 1 Utah 2d 186, 187, 264 P.2d 850, 851 (1953).
171 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.D.C. 1955). See also In re Mantell, 157 Neb.
900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954).




challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason. . . It is common
knowledge that such an adjudication when based upon a charge of corn-
mitting an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight upon the character of
and is a serious impediment to the future of such minor. Let him attempt
to enter the armed service of his country or obtain a position of honor and
trust and he is immediately confronted with his juvenile court record.
And, further, as in this case, the minor is taken from his family, deprived
of his liberty and confined in a state institution. . . Never should [a
juvenile court act] be made an instrument for the denial to a minor of a
constitutional right or of a guarantee afforded by law to an adult.173
The right of the parent to the care and company of his child and the
right of the child to his liberty-in the language of a federal court, "the
natural rights of parents to rear and educate their own children in the
parental home and the natural right of the child to be so reared"'17 4 --
represent high values in our hierarchy of rights. These are not to be
abridged or denied by the convenient semantics of legislative bodies.
The applicability of the constitutional rights indicated hinges not on
labels used but on the effect of the proceedings conducted by the state.
If a child is in danger of being fined, of being deprived of his liberty,
removed from his parents and his home and incarcerated in any insti-
tution of the state, then the minor is entitled to the customary consti-
tutional safeguards locally given to adults accused of crime. It is no
longer even respectable to deny that the child's "liberty" is taken. A
number of years ago Lindsey wrote, "Many of the provisions of the
Juvenile Court Acts are clearly in conflict with constitutional provisions
and this conclusion can only be escaped by evasion. In the case of com-
mitment to an institution there is often a very real deprivation of liberty,
nor is this fact changed by refusing to call it punishment or because the
good of the child is stated to be the object." 175 And recently Judge Holt-
-zoff added, "Precious constitutional rights cannot be diminished or
whittled away by the device of changing names of tribunals or modifying
the nomenclature of legal proceedings. The test must be the nature and
the essence of the proceedings rather than its title. If the result may be
a loss of personal liberty, the constitutional safeguards apply." 17 The
time has come to recognize not only the protections inherent in due
process of law, but to insist that the safeguards surrounding crniinal
prosecutions in the bills of right apply to children who stand before
juvenile court judges.
173 In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952).
174 In re Custody of a Minor, 250 F.2d 419, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger, J.).
175 1926 Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, 28.
176 United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.D.C. 1958), reversed on other
grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Note too the dissent of justice Musmanno in In re
Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), and the dissent of Justice Crane in People v.
Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
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